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Abstract 
This article introduces the concept of ‘noxious deindustrialization’ – employment 
deindustrialization in areas where significantly noxious industries are still operating – and 
explores some implications of this paradox by studying community-industry relations in the 
Scottish petrochemical town of Grangemouth. In the heyday of ‘Boomtown Grangemouth’ 
during the first three decades after World War II, there existed an implicit social contract 
between the local industry and community in which male fenceline residents had widespread 
access to secure and well-paid employment in the factories, but the community had to accept 
the related pollution and hazards. This social contract gradually declined since the late 1970s 
due to a combination of automation, rising qualification barriers and associated long-range 
recruiting, and outsourcing to a partially itinerant workforce. For the Grangemouth community, 
this trend led to the current situation of employment deindustrialization coupled with the 
continuing exposure to the socioenvironmental damage and hazards engendered by operating 
petrochemical plants. We argue that noxious deindustrialization – with its dystopian corollaries 
of rising inequality and precarity, cumulative environmental degradation, and loosening 
community ties – is happening both globally and in local areas, and that Grangemouth is a 
dramatic example of noxious deindustrialization on a local level, where the phenomenon has 









‘I grew up amid Manchester’s smokestacks. I want to put the factories back’ is the title of a 
Sunday Times interview with billionaire businessman Jim Ratcliffe, in which the CEO and 
main owner of petrochemical company INEOS states his vision for a fracking-powered1 Brexit 
that will deliver manufacturing jobs to the areas of the United Kingdom (UK) most hit by 
deindustrialization (Arlidge, 2017). Indeed, ‘smokestack nostalgia’ (Cowie and Heathcott, 
 
1 Fracking, or hydraulic fracturing, is a non-conventional method of oil and gas extraction 
based on the injection of pressurised liquids into bedrock formations. It is controversial due to 
the risks of earthquakes and water contamination and its contribution to global heating. 
2003) has played a major role in recent public debates in many Western countries, as the heyday 
of post-World War II (WWII) industrial growth is widely remembered as a time of rising 
prosperity and security (Tomlinson, 2017). However, as this research contributes to show, 
operating factories do not come with such benefits anymore. 
‘Grangemouth has got all the symptoms of a town that industries left it’,2 asserted a 
retired petrochemical worker from the Scottish town hosting INEOS’ refinery and 
petrochemical complex. At first blush, this claim seems paradoxical, even absurd, for a place 
where the smokestack fumes are visible throughout the day and an orange glow shines all night, 
where the smell of chemicals is familiar to all inhabitants just as much as the flames and 
vibrations produced by heavy flaring.3 Yet the participant was referring to a very real 
phenomenon that we call ‘noxious deindustrialization’, i.e. employment deindustrialization in 
areas where significantly noxious industries are still operating. 
The ‘noxiousness’ in noxious deindustrialization is a translation of the Italian word 
‘nocività’, which indicates the property of causing harm. Through its use by the Italian labor 
movement, the word came to refer to production-induced damage against both human and non-
human life (Feltrin and Sacchetto, 2021). Noxiousness thus understood goes beyond emissions 
and accidents to encompass the hazards for mental and physical health engendered by the rising 
social inequality, precarious work patterns, and loosening community ties associated with 
noxious deindustrialization. 
In our definition, noxious deindustrialization is an on-going and self-reproducing 
process linked to operating plants. Therefore, noxious deindustrialization differs from the toxic 
legacies of past production – e.g. the long-standing contamination of soils and waters (Mah, 
2012) – and from the social disruption caused by deindustrialization – e.g. rising rates of 
depression and drug addiction (McIvor, 2017) – after the factories have closed. Additionally, 
as employment deindustrialization is measured by the share of manufacturing in total 
employment in a given area, noxious deindustrialization is a scalable concept: it can be applied 
to particular fenceline communities – i.e. communities exposed to the localized noxious 
impacts of the industry – as well as to the national, regional, and global levels. 
In this article, we deploy the concept of noxious deindustrialization to innovatively 
connect deindustrial studies with political economy on the one hand and environmental justice 
studies on the other hand. In political economy, deindustrialization most often refers to 
 
2 Focus group 1, 21 October 2019, Grangemouth. 
3 Flaring refers to the combustion of gases and liquids through flare stacks. It constitutes a 
significant source of industrial emissions in the petrochemical sector. 
declining shares of manufacturing in total employment, regardless of industrial output (e.g. 
Benanav, 2020; Rowthorn and Ramaswamy, 1997).4 ‘Noxious deindustrialization’ is thus, 
more precisely, ‘noxious employment deindustrialization’, but the shortened phrase is used 
throughout the article for the sake of brevity. Deindustrialization thus defined can very well 
coexist with continuing or even growing industrial production. This understanding is quite 
different from the one offered by deindustrial studies, which venture beyond the statistics to 
foreground the human costs of deindustrialization through recounting the lived experiences of 
workers and industrial communities facing plant closures (see High et al., 2017; Mah 2012). 
The main focus of environmental justice studies, instead, is the uneven distribution of 
the burdens caused by polluting and hazardous industries (Davies, 2018; Lerner, 2012). 
Therefore, while deindustrial studies focus on the sufferings brought to communities by factory 
closures (e.g. unemployment and weakening community ties), environmental justice studies 
conversely foreground the strains generated by operating factories (e.g. environmental 
degradation and health effects). These two sets of problems are usually seen as mutually 
exclusive, yet – if deindustrialization is understood in terms of employment shares rather than 
as plants shutting down – they can be visited upon populations simultaneously. 
Deindustrial studies have not detected the phenomenon of noxious deindustrialization, 
as they have focused on the localized impacts of factory closures more than on the macro-
employment patterns analyzed by political economy and the unequal distribution of industrial 
burdens analyzed by environmental justice studies. However, our research shows that the 
insights developed by deindustrial studies on the crises experienced by deindustrialized 
communities – in terms of the betrayal of former social contracts (Phillips, 2013), deindustrial 
ruination as a protracted and multifaceted decline (Mah, 2012), demoralization and loss of 
purpose (McIvor, 2017), and enduring nostalgia (Cowie and Heathcott, 2003) – usefully 
contribute to make sense of noxious deindustrialization too. 
This research explores noxious deindustrialization through the perceptions of fenceline 
residents in Grangemouth, Scotland. Through waves of automation, long-range recruiting, and 
outsourcing, employment deindustrialization has indeed occurred in the very capital of the 
Scottish petrochemical industry. In the three post-WWII decades, the Grangemouth branches 
of British Petroleum (BP) and Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) substantially contributed to 
the local employment and tax revenues that made the town thrive. This constituted the basis of 
 
4 In her critical review, Fiona Tregenna notes that ‘Deindustrialization is typically 
conceptualised as a decline in manufacturing as a share of total employment’ (2009: 1). 
an implicit social contract between the community and the petrochemical industry in 
Grangemouth, that is, an understanding of mutual obligations that was seen as broadly 
acceptable by both parties. Yet, as our findings show, changing employment and fiscal patterns 
gradually unraveled the social contract towards the current situation of noxious 
deindustrialization, in which the fenceline community no longer significantly benefits from the 
industry in terms of jobs and public services, but is still exposed to its socioenvironmental 
noxiousness. 
In a nutshell, this article argues that noxious deindustrialization is happening both 
globally and in local areas, and that Grangemouth is a dramatic example of noxious 
deindustrialization on a local level, where the phenomenon has put a strain on community-
industry relations. This research thus makes an original contribution to the existing literature 
by introducing and exploring a new concept that connects deindustrial studies to political 
economy and environmental justice studies. 
The first section of the article is a methodological note. In the second section, we 
discuss noxious deindustrialization on a global scale and relate the concept to different bodies 
of literature. In the third section, we analyze the fraying of the post-WWII social contract 
between the Grangemouth community and the petrochemical industry. The final section 
describes how the paradox of noxious deindustrialization is experienced by the Grangemouth 





This research combines a discussion of general trends with an in-depth study of community-
industry relations in Grangemouth. The thesis of noxious deindustrialization on a global scale 
is supported by an analysis of statistics, secondary sources, and our previous multi-site research 
for the Global Petrochemical Map. The exploration of noxious deindustrialization in the case 
of Grangemouth is based on original fieldwork conducted between April and October 2019. 
We chose Grangemouth as an iconic case study of a petrochemical town in the UK, as part of 
a larger comparative study, ‘Toxic Expertise: Environmental Justice and the Global 
Petrochemical Industry,’ examining petrochemical industrial communities around the world. 
 The Global Petrochemical Map is an online public resource including 75 reports on 
petrochemical complexes across the world that was launched by the Toxic Expertise project in 
2019.5 The Map’s cases were selected based on geographic distribution, economic significance, 
and the intensity of community mobilizations and industrial disputes. The reports supply 
information on industrial production and histories, fenceline communities, health and 
environmental impacts, community mobilizations, and industrial disputes for each case.  
Fieldwork in Grangemouth featured three focus groups and ten semi-structured 
interviews with a total of thirty participants, ten females and twenty males. The focus group 
members volunteered to share their views after we publicized a call for participants offline and 
online (e.g. via flyers, social media groups). The focus groups included local residents from a 
range of age groups – with the youngest being in their thirties and the oldest in their seventies 
– and backgrounds, including current and previous industrial workers. Participant sampling in 
the focus groups reflected those willing to engage in the discussion and with the free time to 
do so. Meanwhile, the one-to-one interviewees were selected because of their roles as 
community activists, public officials, or workers with experience in the petrochemical industry. 
They were contacted through their institutions or through ‘snowballing’ from previous 
participants. 
The interviews and focus groups explored the participants’ understandings of the 
evolution of community-industry relations in Grangemouth. The questions revolved around 
perceptions of Grangemouth as a place to live, of the benefits and burdens related to the 
petrochemical industry, of the evolution of employment and environmental trends, of the role 
of public authorities, and of potential solutions to the problems flagged by the participants. 
Both the focus groups and interviews were semi-structured and open, driven by the 
participants’ concerns. Research on Grangemouth also incorporated statistics, reports by public 
authorities, documents released by the industry, and news articles. 
 
 
Noxious Deindustrialization and the Erosion of Fordist Social Contracts 
 
The petrochemical sector expanded spectacularly during and after WWII, in the so-called 
‘Fordist’ phase of capitalist development (Neilson and Rossiter, 2008). In the context of the 
Fordist class compromise, implicit community-industry social contracts were established in 
several localities, with residents gaining access to well-paid, secure jobs in exchange for the 
 
5 The GPM can be accessed here: 
https://globalpetrochemicalmap.communitymaps.org.uk/welcome (accessed 7 June 2020). 
acceptance of pollution and hazards. Such social contracts differed widely depending on 
contextual factors and their benefits were unevenly distributed, as the Fordist compromise itself 
was built on manifold global exclusions along gendered, racial, imperial, and environmental 
lines (Brand and Wissen, 2021).6 However, class struggles and competitive pressures, 
particularly from the 1970s onwards, resulted in the gradual erosion of many community-
industry social contracts. This section analyses two trends that contributed to such erosion, 
employment deindustrialization and cumulative noxiousness, with a focus on the petrochemical 
industry. The outcome of these tendencies combined is noxious deindustrialization. 
A debate is underway on whether employment deindustrialization on a global scale is 
caused by automation, and on whether the latter poses a danger of endemic joblessness. Some 
authors argue that threats to employment levels are due to the prowess of digital technologies 
(e.g. Schwab, 2016). However, Aaron Benanav has shown that profit-driven technological 
change has led to global employment deindustrialization and growing underemployment in 
recent decades not because of exceptionally high productivity gains but because of 
exceptionally low output growth (Benanav, 2020). In other words, global economic growth is 
so slow that even modest productivity gains are faster, and thus have an impact on employment. 
Nonetheless, automation and slow growth are best seen as interrelated, as Alexis 
Moraitis and Jack Copley note in their sympathetic critique:  
 
Benanav’s contention that it is stagnation rather than automation that is the cause of 
low labor demand creates an unnecessary dichotomy between these two processes, 
overlooking their intrinsic link. In fact, today’s downturn mirrors yesterday’s high 
productivity growth. In capitalism, stagnation is not the radical opposite of 
technological progress, but its necessary outcome (Moraitis and Copley, 2021). 
 
The combination of automation and slow growth leads to employment 
deindustrialization as a global phenomenon, as countries that never reached high levels of 
industrialization ‘import’ deindustrialization together with cheap manufactured products 
(Rodrik, 2016). 
Automation is a longstanding trend in the petrochemical sector, a typical capital-
intensive branch (Hanieh, 2021). Programmable logic controllers and distributed control 
 
6 Grangemouth is an example of this, as BP and ICI’s core workforce was almost entirely 
constituted of white male British citizens, and the high profitability of these companies also 
depended on the appropriation of resources from the Global South and unrestrained pollution. 
systems started to be deployed in the 1970s (Seborg, 2009), while the most recent innovations 
are categorized as ‘Industry 4.0’, i.e. the articulation of the Internet of Things, cloud 
technology, and big data in productive processes (Schwab, 2016). Digitalization represents a 
leap forward in the automation of the collection, processing, and communication of 
information, but also in the surveillance of the workers (Moore et al., 2018). 
In a context of low or negative output growth, the erosion of jobs affected by 
technological change advances more rapidly than the creation of new employment elsewhere 
in the economy at comparable relative wages and conditions. As most people still need to work 
for a living, the outcome – rather than mass unemployment – is a relative decrease in the share 
of secure, core workers and increasing precarity in countries and sectors that used to guarantee 
certain levels of job security to parts of their workforces (Benanav, 2015). 
The dualism between direct employees and outsourced workers existed in the 
petrochemical industry even in the heyday of the vertically integrated Fordist company, for 
example in the construction of the plants and in periodical maintenance. Since the neoliberal 
rise of ‘lean manufacturing’, however, a widening range of tasks has been assigned to contract 
workers through a bewildering array of juridical forms that varies depending on national 
regulatory frameworks. These tasks include ‘peripheral’ activities such as cleaning, catering, 
gardening, and security but have come to also encompass logistics and a significant share of 
all-year maintenance (Lafuente Hérnandez et al., 2016). On average, outsourcing means 
shorter tenures, lower wages, and worse conditions relative to in-house jobs. This arrangement 
further fragments the workforce, makes it more geographically mobile, heightens the 
competition among workers, and weakens union leverage. Unsurprisingly, outsourced workers 
tend to be those most exposed to workplace hazards (see Rebitzer, 1995). 
While outsourcing is a general trend, the petrochemical sector presents some specific 
characteristics. The first is that ‘In continuous or process industries, in which human labor – 
particularly maintenance – is disconnected from the automatic functioning of the machines, it 
is even more difficult to distinguish between core “productive” activities and “auxiliary” ones’7 
(Lafuente Hérnandez et al., 2016: 153). Secondly, petrochemical plants need to periodically 
halt production for weeks to perform major maintenance and renovation works. During such 
shutdowns, the ratio of outsourced over in-house workers increases significantly, as specific 
and itinerant professional figures are brought in the host plant, some of them highly specialized. 
In fact, the outsourced workforce is itself steeply stratified, from relatively unskilled tasks (e.g. 
 
7 Translated from Spanish by the authors. 
cleaning, hazardous maintenance) to highly skilled ones (e.g. specialized technical 
maintenance). 
Additionally, technological change in large-scale industry contributed to transforming 
the skills composition of its workforce. In fact, automation is based on the objectification of 
workers’ previously ‘clandestine’ knowledge (Alquati, 1963), which – before being 
incorporated in the machines – could only be gained through learning-by-doing on the job. 
Instead, the codified knowledge required to operate highly automated industrial systems must 
be acquired through formal education. There is thus a generalized shift from particularistic to 
universalistic skills in the core workforce of large-scale industry (Charnock and Starosta, 2018: 
338). As a consequence, fewer fenceline community members are able to make inroads in it, 
because the fewer jobs available are awarded not based on geographical convenience and 
informal, localized mechanisms of skills transfer, but according to rankings in formal, 
deterritorialized educational proficiency. 
On the other hand, the petrochemical industry has increasingly become the target of 
concerns over the noxiousness caused by greenhouse gases and plastic waste – impacting on 
the global environment – and industrial hazards and toxic emissions – mainly threatening 
petrochemical workers and fenceline communities on a local level. 
For what concerns its localized collateral damage, the petrochemical sector underwent 
numerous high-profile accidents that resulted in many deaths of residents and workers, such as 
the Flixborough disaster in the UK (1974), the Los Alfaques disaster in Spain (1978), and – by 
far the worst – the Bhopal catastrophe in India (1984). Less visible but just as deadly, the ‘slow 
violence’ of toxicity (Nixon, 2011) has also taken a high toll on residents and employees 
exposed to carcinogenic substances such as benzene (Jephcote and Mah, 2019) or vinyl 
chloride (Markovitz and Rosner, 2002). 
In recent decades, health and safety standards have overall improved due to 
environmental regulations. Yet, green techno-fixes in large-scale industry have been offset by 
output growth and the cumulative nature of environmental degradation. It is the accumulation 
of noxiousness that has led to today’s planetary ecological crisis, with its well-known 
predicaments including global heating, biodiversity loss, soil depletion, persistent plastic 
pollution, etc. Such accumulation makes moderate improvements in the environmental 
performance of large-scale industry insufficient to tackle the ecological crisis. This probably 
contributes to explain the apparent contradiction that environmental sensibility is more 
widespread today than when industry was in fact more polluting. As a major contributor to 
climate change and toxic pollution, the petrochemical industry is still unsustainable and 
unhealthy, according to environmental campaigners and public health experts (Azoulay et al., 
2019; Mudu et al., 2013). 
The disembedding of the workforce from local communities lowers the latter’s 
incentives to overlook industrial noxiousness and – combined with the general increase of 
public environmental awareness – enhances the likelihood of community-industry tensions, as 
documented in many cases across the world (e.g. Allen, 2003; López-Navarro, 2020; Sun and 
Huang, 2020). Consistent with the key thesis of environmental justice studies, the noxious 
burdens of the petrochemical industry tend to fall disproportionately on minority and low-
income communities (Lerner, 2012). In North America, framings around environmental racism 
are foregrounded as many sites were built in the proximities of minority communities (e.g. 
Davies, 2018). In these cases, the local communities never benefited from a relatively favorable 
social contract, as their members had little access to jobs in the factories’ core workforce. In 
Europe, the plants are more often located by communities whose members used to have 
widespread access to employment in the factories. Today these communities remain mostly 
working class, albeit less industrially employed, and thus class-based framings are more 
prominent (e.g. Bush et al., 2001). 
If yearly CO2 emissions are accepted as an admittedly simplistic proxy for noxiousness, 
the intersection of employment deindustrialization and noxiousness on a global scale – global 
noxious deindustrialization – can be visualized in the graph below. The graph includes both 
total and industrial CO2 emissions because it is useful to consider not only the noxiousness 
released by industrial production directly, but also the noxiousness generated by industrial 
products when used by their consumers. The proxy is indeed simplistic, because it is possible 
to imagine a situation of noxious deindustrialization in which CO2 emissions are brought to net 
zero, but the ecological crisis persists due to other forms of noxiousness (e.g. fossil fuels could 
be substituted with nuclear energy, but this could generate its own environmental degradation). 









Graph 1. Global noxious deindustrialization (base year = 1991) 
 
Source: ILOSTAT and Climate Analysis Indicators Tool. 
 
ILOSTAT estimates on the global share of manufacturing employment are available 
from 1991 only. According to them, the figure has slowly declined from 16.4% in 1991 to 14% 
in 2018. In the same period, total yearly CO2 emissions increased from 23 to 36 billion tons, 
and yearly emissions generated by industrial production rose from 4.4 billion tons to 7.6 billion 
tons.8 Since the dawn of capitalism, the global share of manufacturing employment and CO2 
emissions have long increased in tandem. However, as Graph 1 indicates, at some point of the 
second half of the 20th century there has been a decoupling between the two historical series: 
the share of manufacturing employment peaked while yearly CO2 emissions continued to soar 
despite improvements in the environmental performances of industry, mainly due to the rise in 
global output over this period. Of course, these global trends are iterated in extremely different 
ways across countries, depending on the timing and scale of national-level industrialization. 
Behind the dry statistics lies the ruination of the livelihoods and modes of existence of 
millions of households and thousands of communities foregrounded by deindustrial studies 
(see High et al., 2017; Mah, 2012; McIvor, 2017; Phillips, 2013). On a local level, indeed, 
noxious deindustrialization was a key factor in the erosion of the post-WWII community-
industry social contract in sites where such compromise used to be in place. While unevenness, 
 
8 Consistent with our definition of noxious deindustrialization, the graph reports figures for 
manufacturing and not for industrial employment, which in ILOSTAT’s definition includes 
mining, construction, and utilities in addition to manufacturing. Industrial CO2 emissions, 
instead, are the sum of emissions released by industrial processes and by energy used in 
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context, and exceptions should be stressed, our research for the Global Petrochemical Map 
confirmed that such localized developments are far from rare.  
The concept of noxious deindustrialization thus provides a bridge between the analysis 
of general employment trends and their effects in terms of inequality and precarity (the domain 
of political economy), the in-depth study of the fragilization of former industrial communities 
(the domain of deindustrial studies), and the investigation of the unequal environmental and 
health burdens of industry (the domain of environmental justice studies). 
Grangemouth is a dramatic example of noxious deindustrialization, as the steep fall in 
the quantity and quality of industrial jobs available to the locals – coupled with a decline in tax 
revenues – unfolded in the shadow of the uninterrupted operations of the largest petrochemical 
complex in Scotland. Research on community-industry relations in Grangemouth in the early 
2000s concluded that: ‘Today this is a town in crisis. In a mood of growing pessimism and 
distrust, public doubts about the economic security and environmental safety of the town have 
provoked increasingly vocal local opposition to planning applications which would extend 
activity in chemicals while economic diversification is denied’ (Schlüter et al., 2004: 715). In 
the following sections, we show how – fifteen years later – community-industry relations 
deteriorated even further. 
 
 
From Scotland’s Boomtown to Dumping Ground? The Erosion of the Community-
Industry Social Contract 
 
Grangemouth’s industrial zones, located in the Falkirk Council area, constitute Scotland’s main 
petrochemical center. In 1919, the chemical plant Scottish Dyes Ltd was established and in 
1928 it was bought by ICI. Grangemouth’s original refinery, instead, was built in 1924 by the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which would become BP thirty years later. The refinery increased 
its capacity in the 1940s-1950s and further expanded in the 1970s after the discovery of North 
Sea oil. In 1951, BP also established its petrochemical plants at the site. The town grew around 
its industry, with housing built by the council and BP to shelter a burgeoning workforce. 
 In the 1990s, the former ICI site was restructured, downsized, and later divided between 
a number of companies. In 2005, BP sold its refinery and petrochemical plants to INEOS, a 
private company founded by Jim Ratcliffe in 1998, which swiftly rocketed to the top ten 
chemical companies worldwide. Additionally, INEOS owns the two power stations servicing 
the industrial complex. Since 2011, the refinery belongs to Petroineos, a 50:50 joint-venture 
between INEOS and PetroChina. In 2017, INEOS also acquired the Forties Pipeline System, 
which delivers almost 40% of the UK’s North Sea oil and gas production (Thomas, 2017). 
According to the company, its assets in Grangemouth produce 9 million liters of fuels per day 
and over 1.3 million tons of chemicals per year, contributing 4% of Scottish GDP (INEOS, 
2020a). In addition to INEOS’ assets, Grangemouth hosts the plants of other chemical 
companies (CalaChem, Fujifilm, Syngenta, Versalis), the largest container port in Scotland, 
and some non-chemical factories. 
The overarching theme of our fieldwork was Grangemouth’s decline relative to the 
three post-WWII decades, when it was called ‘Scotland’s Boomtown’. During an interview, 
one of the first women in Grangemouth to have worked on the shopfloor of a petrochemical 
plant recalled: 
 
Grangemouth was a great place to grow up because the council were forward-thinking, 
and you didn’t really have to leave the town for anything. We had superb sports 
facilities. […] The council here were very accommodating to the industry because they 
knew what side their bread was buttered on. With the high taxes and things and I don’t 
think they got away with anything, but they were appreciated much more so than they 
are now.9 
 
The boom period was followed by a multi-faceted decline – in prosperity, population, 
reputation, community cohesion, industrial jobs for the locals, employment terms and 
conditions, tax revenue, public services and transport, housing and infrastructure, industry 
contributions to the community, activities in the town center, etc. – leading to a self-reinforcing 
downward spiral: ‘Like a cancer, the whole thing is feeding off itself, you know?’,10 
commented a community volunteer during a focus group. This story of ruination is strikingly 
similar to those of former industrial towns, and yet industry in Grangemouth is alive and well. 
In Grangemouth, post-war nostalgia overwhelmingly coincides with BP nostalgia (and 
to a lesser extent ICI). In ‘the golden years’, BP was ‘a good company to work for’, ‘something 
to be proud of’, ‘helpful and supportive’, ‘family oriented’, ‘part of the community’, ‘at a 
different level’, ‘just incredible’, ‘you know, great’. Compare and contrast with comments on 
INEOS – ‘very bad neighbors’, ‘hard-headed’, ‘secretive’, ‘ridiculous’ – and Jim Ratcliffe – 
 
9 Interview, 25 October 2019, Grangemouth. 
10 Focus group 2. 
‘loose cannon’, ‘very immoral’, ‘bully-boy’, ‘absolute rat’. BP and ICI’s paternalism towards 
the community – their local social clubs and large donations to events, projects, and individuals 
– is often contrasted to INEOS’ ‘bare minimum’, ‘tick box’, ‘too little, too late’.11 Yet the main 
points of comparison are that during BP and ICI’s early age most workers employed in the 
industry resided in Grangemouth and the town received abundant tax revenues relative to 
today. 
 The decline of local employment in the petrochemical industry is the complaint that 
was most often foregrounded. As a civil servant noted, ‘When Grangemouth grew, particularly 
in the petrochemical sector, people didn’t have cars and things, so there is some fantastic 
footage […] and everyone is commuting to work locally by bicycle. […] You’d think it was 
Beijing in terms of that, so the people that did work in the area worked and stayed in the area’.12 
The slow-motion downfall of Boomtown Grangemouth began with BP’s piecemeal 
privatization, which occurred between 1977 and 1987. This was accompanied by a 
restructuring of employment that reduced the quantity and quality of jobs available to the 
locals. A charity worker, the son of a BP operator, reflected on such rise in employment 
precarity: ‘You weren’t given that life-changing career option that everybody else had been 
given. […] Thatcher didn’t want to do that’.13  
This process gradually brought the number of direct employees in the complex from 
5,500 in the 1980s (Phillimore et al. 2007: 76) to about 1,300 today (INEOS, 2020b).14 A 
dramatic step in this trend occurred in 2002, when BP suddenly cut its workforce by 700 (Lyon, 
2017: 38-40). According to Scotland’s Census data, in 1961’s Grangemouth, manufacturing in 
total employment stood at 55%, with ‘chemicals and allied industries’ constituting a staggering 
44.5% of total employment. Fifty years later, manufacturing in total employment had been 
dashed to 13%, a fraction of what it used to be. 
The long-term decline in local employment for the petrochemical industry was due to 
three interrelated tendencies: increasing automation, qualification barriers and associated long-
range recruiting, and outsourcing. Automation diminished the number of jobs available15 and, 
 
11 All quotes in this paragraph are from focus groups and interviews held in 2019 in 
Grangemouth. 
12 Interview, 22 October 2019, Grangemouth. 
13 Interview, 3 April 2019, Grangemouth. 
14 Of these, only a small number are based in the FK3 postcode area (i.e. Grangemouth) (only 
a few tens out of a population of over 16,000 was employed by INEOS, according to an 
estimate by the Community Council based on data provided by INEOS). 
15 Similarly, containerization has greatly reduced the jobs available at the Grangemouth docks. 
of the remaining jobs, the in-house ones required qualifications that were more difficult for 
local residents to attain, while the less qualified ones were outsourced to a partially itinerant 
workforce of contract and agency workers. INEOS hosts a number of apprenticeships from 
local schools,16 yet the scheme can hardly reverse the general trend of decreased quantity and 
quality of local employment in the industry.  
Wages and conditions have also generally declined for INEOS’ in-house workers, 
especially after Unite the Union was defeated in an industrial dispute that culminated in 
October 2013 (Lyon, 2017; Ratcliffe and Heath, 2018). On this occasion, INEOS threatened to 
close the site if the workers did not accept the withdrawal of their final salary pension scheme, 
a three-year freeze on wages and industrial action, and other deteriorations in terms and 
conditions. As the union gave in, workers were made to reapply for their own jobs on the new 
terms and the two leading Unite shop stewards – Stevie Deans and Mark Lyon – were pressured 
to quit and sacked respectively, in a setback that became emblematic of the relative decline of 
a formerly solid union power. A labor activist asserted that: ‘It was just a culture of fear in the 
company amongst the workforce’.17 
The workers’ disaffection with INEOS was such that an estimated 30-40% of the direct 
employees quit in the period after the dispute, mainly to take jobs in the North Sea and the 
Arabian Gulf. However, this did not mean a significant rise in employment opportunities for 
the locals due to the qualifications and experience required. Instead, the remaining employees 
worked longer overtimes while the new recruits came from as far as Wales, where the Milford 
Haven Refinery had recently been decommissioned. As shift workers take 12-hour shifts (day 
and night), overtime shifts result in extremely long working weeks. Moreover, due to the 
pension scheme reform, early retirement is now a costly option. The overall result is the 
paradox – from the workforce’s standpoint – of older workers doing long hours and travelling 
from remote locations while the local youths struggle to find employment in the plants on their 
doorstep. 
 These changes in employment patterns have put a major strain on community-industry 
relations: ‘It was a boomtown. Well, no longer it’s a boomtown. […] Technology changed and 
now there are so many programmable logic controllers and then, of course, they outsourced a 
lot of their staff to contractors. Now, they used to have boilermakers, electricians, fitters and 
 
16 The apprenticeships last four years and in 2018 INEOS Grangemouth had ‘more than 70 
currently in training across the refining and petrochemical complex’ (East, 2018). 
17 Interview with a retired electrician, 3 October 2019, Grangemouth. 
everything in-house’,18 ‘What we have now is what we refer to as DIDOs or Drive In and Drive 
Out. People drive into work and they drive out at night. They take their well-earned cash with 
them, and they spend it elsewhere’.19 
The downward trend in employment was paralleled by a decline in tax revenue. Many 
participants underlined the fact that tax receipts diminished abruptly after Grangemouth, up to 
that point ‘the Kuwait of Scotland’, was incorporated in the Falkirk Council area in 1975. Non-
domestic rates were thus spread across Falkirk, which at the time was suffering from its own 
earlier deindustrialization. Since the early 1990s, non-domestic rates have been pooled by the 
Scottish government and then redistributed, and Grangemouth does not receive significant 
extra revenue for the presence of the petrochemical industry. Less prominent in the interviews 
was the fact that business taxes and taxes on high incomes in the UK were lowered between 
‘the good days’20 and the present ones. However, some participants mentioned tax avoidance, 
as INEOS moved its headquarters from the UK to Switzerland in 2010 and partially returned 
to the UK in 2016, after the corporation tax rate was cut (Miller, 2017). Additionally, the 
company kept important holdings in tax havens such as the Isle of Man (Financial Times, 
2019). Jim Ratcliffe himself changed his residence to tax-free Monaco. With less tax revenues 
came fewer public services, poorer maintenance of the existing infrastructure, and a scarcity of 
resources to revitalize the town center: ‘There are empty flats that are falling to bits, empty 
shops and one in four retail properties are empty’.21 
The overall picture drawn by the interviewees is thus one of frustration and decline, 
with the fear that the area has been turning from ‘Scotland’s Boomtown’ to ‘Scotland’s 
dumping ground’ surfacing at different times. This is also reflected in perceptions of weakening 
community spirit and attachment to Grangemouth: 
 
We used to have a wee kind of pathway, a secret pathway into the back of the BP and 
everything when we were kids, and we had a great childhood there. I was quite surprised 
a couple of years ago. My own nephew who stayed over in the old town and another 
young guy that I met, they never had the same feelings about Grangemouth. They 
always wanted to get out.22 
 
18 Focus group 1. 
19 Interview with a retired contract worker, 23 October 2019, Grangemouth. 
20 Focus group 2. 
21 Focus group 1. 
22 Focus group 1. 
 
The intermeshing memories of a cohesive community and industrial infrastructure are 
typical of ‘smokestack nostalgia’ in other deindustrialized communities, yet in Grangemouth 
the smokestack fumes never left. The next section analyzes the current reality of noxious 
deindustrialization in the petrochemical town. 
 
 
The Paradox of Noxious Deindustrialization: Living with Deindustrial Decline and 
Industrial Noxiousness 
 
In the participants’ narratives, when jobs and taxes from the industry made Grangemouth 
thrive, most locals were happy to put up with the burdens of living with their difficult 
petrochemical neighbor, but such tolerance has decreased together with the perks, even if it is 
generally accepted that the environmental record of the industry has improved over the 
decades. The burdens mainly relate to pollution, hazards, haulage traffic, social stigma, and a 
blockage to economic diversification and the construction of new housing. Additionally, the 
fenceline community has learnt to live with the permanent hum and orange glow at night. 
Pollution is experienced in many forms: lights, noise, smells, vibrations, smokes, 
powders, leaks, etc. The Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) revealed that out of 
the top-twelve CO2 emitting plants in Scotland, five are located in Grangemouth and owned by 
INEOS (Edwards, 2019). As a report to the Scottish Parliament noted: ‘The largest point source 
of emissions in Scotland is now the cluster of industry at Grangemouth, which accounted for 
over 30% of industry emissions in Scotland (3.6 MtCO2) in 2017’ (Committee on Climate 
Change, 2019: 63). Additionally, SEPA declared that INEOS Chemicals failed to report 
accurately CO2 emissions since 2016 (Edwards, 2020). The Petroineos refinery is responsible 
for the vast majority of CO2 emissions among Grangemouth plants (Table 1), emissions which 








Table 1. Emissions in 2018 across Grangemouth industrial sites (kg) 
 SO2 Benzene PM10 CO2 
Petroineos 
refinery 








162,987 BRT 19,116 456.25 million 
INEOS Chemicals BRT in 2015* 25,464 in 2015* 89,720 in 2015* BRT in 2015* 
Versalis BRT BRT BRT 61.10 million 
Fujifilm BRT BRT BRT BRT 
CalaChem BRT BRT BRT 18.02 million 
SEPA 
*More recent data not agreed 
BRT = Below reporting threshold 
 
 
Table 2. Emissions 2002-2018 Petroineos refinery (kg) 















Benzene 145,000 340,824 94,844 145,724 172,754 149,381 141,855 



















Air quality has also been a key concern, with Grangemouth declared as an Air Quality 
Management Area in 2005 to tackle sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions from the refinery. The 
overall data trends point to declining levels of SO2 emissions at the refinery since 2002 (Table 
2). However, in 2018, Petroineos was granted a derogation by SEPA from the European 
requirements to reduce SO2 emissions at two source points (SEPA, 2020a). Moreover, despite 
an overall decline in emissions since 2002, there were gradual increases in particulate matter 
(PM10) emissions at the refinery from 2014 onwards, while emissions of benzene, a known 
carcinogen, are at similar levels in 2018 as they were in 2002 (Table 2). Overall, this data 
shows that the petrochemical industry in Grangemouth is still a major polluter in terms of both 
greenhouse gases and toxic emissions. 
A considerable source of complaints among the locals is heavy flaring, which is 
reported to happen frequently and sometimes for days. Between July 2019 and July 2020, 
SEPA recorded 17 flaring incidences at INEOS sites in Grangemouth (SEPA, 2020b). Some 
nearby residents suffer from sleep deprivation because of the noise, vibrations, light, and smells 
that it entails: ‘You can hear the flares going up […] and then you shut all of your windows 
because it’s absolutely stinking of sulfur, which can’t be healthy’,23 ‘You actually felt your 
house shaking’,24 ‘There’s no peace’.25 Due to flaring, SEPA rated INEOS Forties Pipeline 
System’s environmental performance as ‘very poor’ for 2017 and 2018 (SEPA, 2020c). 
There are no published epidemiological studies about the health effects of the industry 
for Grangemouth specifically. Several participants expressed concerns about suspected health 
effects – particularly cancers and respiratory diseases – and frustration over the difficulties of 
verifying them:  
 
Angus: It’s the amount of people going down with cancer. Has it got anything 
to do with the industry? I don’t really know. 
Fiona: How could you prove that? 
Angus: You never will prove it.26 
 
Additionally, noxious deindustrialization appears to impact on mental health through 
precarious employment patterns and weakening community ties. For instance, a participant in 
his thirties suggested that: ‘The mental health in the area has plummeted. I mean as folk were 
saying about the social clubs, now even the pubs are dead, so nobody is being brought together 
for anything’.27 
Another oft-quoted burden is industrial hazards. The last fatal accidents in 
Grangemouth date back to 1987, yet there have been high profile non-deadly accidents in recent 
years (Food & Water Europe, 2017). Even if the risk of an industrial disaster appears to be low, 
it is potentially severe due to the high concentration of hazardous substances. A frequent 
concern is that the shrinking of the workforce, the outsourcing of maintenance, and the ageing 
of the plants could eventually result in major accidents: ‘The local knowledge is kind of getting 
lost by cutting back and cutting back and so the safety’.28 There were also fears over the fact 
that, after the 2013 industrial dispute, INEOS dismantled the plant-by-plant system of Unite 
health and safety representatives (see Lyon, 2017: 144). 
The participants’ most prominent complaints were about local environmental impacts 
but, while the majority would probably not describe themselves as ‘environmentalists’, some 
 
23 Focus group 1. 
24 Interview with a retired electrician, 3 October 2019, Grangemouth. 
25 Focus group 2. 
26 Focus group 1. All names in the article are pseudonyms. 
27 Focus group 3, 24 October 2019, Grangemouth. 
28 Interview with a charity worker, 3 April 2019, Grangemouth. 
added concerns about the role of the industrial complex in global environmental degradation, 
citing climate change, plastic waste pollution, and the damage caused by Syngenta’s pesticides. 
An example of converging local and global environmental grievances relates to fracking. 
INEOS – the biggest holder of UK fracking licenses – has been lobbying public authorities to 
deregulate fracking. Yet, as a result of the Scottish government’s moratorium on it, the 
company imports fracked ethane from Pennsylvania, USA by ship. To store such gas, it 
inaugurated in 2016 the largest ethane tank in Europe thanks to a £230 million UK government 
loan guarantee and a £8 million Scottish government grant (INEOS, 2016). INEOS took the 
Scottish government to court, challenging their anti-fracking policy, but lost the case in 2018 
(The Scotsman, 2018). Several participants expressed dismay at the prospect of the additional 
environmental damage and hazards that fracking would cause: ‘The only customer for the 
fracked gas is the INEOS plant. That’s it. They want to destroy our countryside, put old people 
at their knees, your insurance goes through the roof and all these earthquakes that are 
happening, like in Blackpool, and deliveries coming in and fire and all the rest of it for one 
man’s greed’.29 
Participants also cited a range of economic burdens. In fact, proximity to the industry 
comes with restrictive regulations on the siting of new facilities within the ‘consultation zones’, 
also known as ‘blast zones.’ For example, other Scottish communities receive benefits from 
wind and solar farms, but these are difficult to install in consultation zones. A significant part 
of the housing stock in Grangemouth is made of flats that were built as council houses. 
According to the participants, these houses are no longer appealing to the core petrochemical 
workforce and those that are still council-owned are allocated to marginalized people from 
elsewhere in Scotland who, due to budget constraints, are not adequately supported to integrate. 
This leads to perceived high incidences of drug abuse and anti-social behavior. 
When asked how the industry benefits the community, participants were divided among 
those who believe there are no significant benefits at all and those who think that the remaining 
jobs and spending by the workers are meaningful advantages. There was however a quasi-
consensus over the notion that benefits had declined to such an extent that they were 
outweighed by the burdens, as these interactions illustrate: 
 
Ewan: But if it had shut what would be the impact on Grangemouth? For Scotland, I 
don’t know, but for Grangemouth I don’t think it would have a great impact. There 
 
29 Focus group 1. 
wouldn’t be mass unemployment because a lot of the people [who live in Grangemouth] 
don’t work here anymore. 
James: Quieter roads. 
Nicola: Less light pollution might be good. 
Ewan: You’d get loads of houses down there.30 
 
Daniel: Grangemouth gets absolutely zero financial benefit for any of this other than 
guys buying a pie down in Greggs or a pint at lunchtime or anything else. We get 
nothing, not a thing and that’s fact.31 
 
 The participants were very aware that changing employment and taxation patterns were 
part of broader national and indeed global trends. Yet, they also pointed at some local 
specificities: Grangemouth’s community-industry relations started to decline from a 
particularly high place and thus the fall was more painful, the concentration of industrial 
infrastructure and associated burdens is unique in today’s UK, and INEOS’ business strategy 
is perceived as exceptionally aggressive. In fact, while the interviewees knew that INEOS is 
not the only polluting industry at their fenceline, they tended to single it out as a target of 
discontent. This was confirmed by an independent consultation commissioned by the Falkirk 
Council: ‘Of all industry that operates within Grangemouth, INEOS was overwhelmingly seen 
as negative’ (Community Links, 2019: 27). 
 Many participants stated that, despite half-yearly briefings to the community liaison 
group and other initiatives for example with schools and associations, INEOS Grangemouth 
does not communicate enough with residents, consider their views, or act transparently. One 
of the latest conflicts concerned INEOS’ plans to shut Bo’ness Road, a key public road that 
runs throughout its complex, which triggered a campaign against the closure. Some also noted 
that enhanced communication without substantial changes is unlikely to help. For example, an 
urban planner said: ‘If you had 6,000 employees who live locally then that’s your publicity. If 
people met up at the BP social club then that’s your publicity. That’s gone now’.32 
 
30 Focus group 3. 
31 Focus group 1. 
32 Focus group 2. 
 The contrast between Jim Ratcliffe’s confrontational attitude and extravagant wealth 
versus the demoralization and ‘abject poverty’33 existing in Grangemouth engenders strong 
feelings of injustice: 
 
Mark: But it’s the levels of social injustice that I feel with living in the town that 
circumstance in the years has eluded us locally of the monies that probably made life 
really tolerable in the town. 
David: Well, to hear that and when you actually hear the wealth of INEOS…34 
 
While Ratcliffe was declared the UK’s richest individual in 2018 with a wealth of over 
£21 billion (Smith, 2018), Grangemouth includes five areas falling within the most deprived 
10% of Scotland (Falkirk Council, 2020). Fuel poverty was described as particularly 
paradoxical given the proximity of the refinery: ‘We’re giving food parcels out and people say, 
“Is there anything we can eat cold?” because they can’t afford the power to heat it up, so what 
do you do? I mean it is heart breaking’.35 
 A widely held opinion is that Ratcliffe has a disproportionate amount not only of 
wealth, but of power too. In little more than a decade, INEOS acquired the infrastructure that 
produces 4% of Scotland’s GDP, refines 80% of its fuel, and delivers almost 40% of the North 
Sea oil and gas (Thomas, 2017). This is aggravated by the fact that INEOS is a privately-owned 
company and thus its majority-owner and CEO Ratcliffe does not face the same accountability 
requirements of public companies, not to mention state-owned ones. Frustration at this 
concentration of power emerged on several occasions: ‘It would bring tears to your eyes to 
hear what this town is like for people who live in it and I guess again, some of that is coming 
back to INEOS and holding the town to ransom’,36 ‘They’ve also got the North Sea pipeline 
now, so he’s got a stranglehold on Scotland really’,37 ‘Why the Scottish government allowed 
that to happen, I don’t know’.38 
The latter comment points to the skepticism towards public authorities – seen as 
unwilling or unable to stand up to the industry – displayed by several respondents including 
one public official: ‘They don’t have the authority, so it’s like this big beast is just out of 
 
33 Focus group 3. 
34 Focus group 2. 
35 Focus group 1. 
36 Focus group 3. 
37 Focus group 3. 
38 Focus group 1. 
control’.39 Such feeling of powerlessness is projected not only on public institutions but also 
on the community itself: 
 
Daniel: The people of Grangemouth, it’s almost like it’s beating them down. They don’t 
come to meetings and they don’t want to get involved with things, you know? 
Fiona: Perhaps they’re scared to. 
Daniel: No. I just don’t think they’re on the level to complain about it. 
Rachel: I think they just feel that they’re banging their head against a brick wall.40 
 
A contract worker summarized the experience of noxious deindustrialization as 
follows: 
 
I’ve lived in Grangemouth for all my days. […] I watched the industry go downhill and 
what I feel more about INEOS now is there’s more people coming into the town to 
work and the people in the town can’t get the jobs. […] We’ve got to put up with the 
noise, the smell, and the danger most of all. I mean I’m two minutes from the refinery 
and the noises and the sky lighting up at night can be quite scary. […] I shouldn’t have 
to travel away from the town to get work when that’s on my doorstep. I just don’t think 





There’s jobs and there’s prospects so please have no fears,  
There’s building of oil rigs and houses and piers,  
There’s a boom-time a-coming, let’s celebrate – cheers (McGrath, 2015: 152). 
 
These are the promises made by fictional oil businessman Texas Jim in The Cheviot, 
the Stag and the Black, Black Oil, a 1973 petro-drama in which playwright John McGrath 
warned about the negative social and environmental impacts of oil-based capitalist 
development in Scotland at the time when North Sea oil was being brought on stream. 
 
39 Interview, 24 October 2019, Grangemouth. 
40 Focus group 1. 
41 Focus group 1. 
Ironically, such boom-time promises arrived when the golden age of Boomtown Grangemouth, 
with its abundance of jobs and prospects, was approaching its end. 
This article has introduced the concept of noxious deindustrialization, a paradoxical 
state of affairs in which a population undergoes the loss of industrial jobs without losing the 
industry itself and the associated noxious burdens. This could constitute the basis of further 
work on the unevenness of noxious deindustrialization based on contextual factors. For 
example, it would be important to investigate experiences of noxious deindustrialization in 
areas less prosperous than Scotland. Another interesting distinction is that between cases in 
which noxious deindustrialization is functional to the long-term survival of an industrial 
complex and cases in which it is a transitional phase towards the full closure of the factories. 
There are also hybrid combinations of these two possibilities, in which – in a given area – some 
plants downsize their core workforce so that they can remain competitive while others are shut 
down. A further issue is the different timings of noxious deindustrialization, both in terms of 
the pace of the process and of the historical timespan in which it takes place in different areas. 
Moreover, parallel processes of automation, precarization, and continuing noxiousness can be 
studied in sectors other than manufacturing, such as mining or logistics. 
Acknowledgement of noxious deindustrialization has implications on how we think 
about the so-called ‘jobs versus environment dilemma’, i.e. the notion that, if something is to 
be gained in terms of good jobs, something must be lost on the side of health and the 
environment. Such dilemma is particularly relevant to large-scale industry, which is both an 
ideal-typical provider of secure, well-paid jobs and an ill-famed environmental felon. The 
understanding of the jobs versus environment dilemma as a zero-sum game has been criticized 
as too pessimistic by the advocates of ‘just transitions’ based on positive-sum games in which 
industry is transformed to be sustainable and provide good jobs at the same time (although the 
social and political transformations needed for this to happen are often underestimated). In a 
way, however, the zero-sum game position is also too optimistic. This is exactly because it fails 
to take into consideration the reality of noxious deindustrialization: a negative-sum game in 
which industrial job losses and environmental degradation progress simultaneously. 
Local community concerns vis-à-vis major industrial installations are often dismissed 
as selfish and in contradiction with the general interest, as the famous acronym Not In My 
Backyard (NIMBY) indicates. In the case of Grangemouth, the locals are asked to put up with 
the burdens of the petrochemical industry in the name of national prosperity, while receiving 
increasingly few local benefits. Recent critical appraisals of NIMBYism posit that local 
populations are not inherently critical towards proximal polluting industrial activities, but may 
become so due to the loss of socio-economic gains or the acceleration of social or 
environmental burdens (e.g. Jerolmack and Walker, 2018). Indeed, local criticisms of highly 
polluting sites can become more aligned with the ‘general interest’ – always an open and 
contested notion – than their defense. 
Certainly, the shiny patina of nostalgia makes for an idealized past just as the starkness 
of proximity makes for a disenchanted present. Yet the dystopian picture of steep social 
inequalities, employment precarity, cumulative environmental degradation, and weakening 
community ties – with their associated risks for physical and mental health – that is painted by 
noxious deindustrialization is something one can be forgiven to be worried about. All the more 
so because, if the combination of automation and slow economic growth spurs employment 
deindustrialization onwards – a very real possibility on a global level –, noxious 
deindustrialization will become more widespread and severe. Employment precarity and 
environmental degradation are far from incompatible. 
While many participants longed for a return of Boomtown Grangemouth, we suggest 
that going back to a romanticized golden age of industrial capitalism is both impossible and 
undesirable. It is impossible because the imperatives of market competition force companies 
to cut costs and raise productivity, no matter the pleasant or distasteful personality of their 
CEOs. It is undesirable because the output growth necessary to re-industrialize employment, 
particularly if one speaks of the petrochemical sector, would be incompatible with the sustained 
reproduction of life on the planet. A way forward could rather be based on wealth 
redistribution, shorter working hours, and a deep transformation of production and 
consumption towards sustainability. The former is necessary to make the latter two socially 
sustainable. As a participant noted: ‘Grangemouth has already transitioned away from the high-
paid jobs, so we’ve started that transition and it’s not been just. […] We need something else’.42 
A concluding line of The Cheviot goes like: ‘Now the Black Black Oil is coming. And 
must come. It could benefit everybody’ (McGrath, 2015: 162). Nearly half a century later, the 









42 Focus group 2. 
Bibliography 
 
Allen BL (2003) Uneasy Alchemy: Citizens and Experts in Louisiana's Chemical Corridor 
Disputes. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press. 
 
Alquati, Romano (1963) Composizione del capitale e forza lavoro alla Olivetti. Quaderni rossi 
3: 119-185. 
 
Arlidge J (2017) I grew up amid Manchester’s smokestacks. I want to put the factories back. 
The Sunday Times, 7 May. Available at: https://www.ineos.com/globalassets/ineos-
group/home/suntimes-interview-john-arlidge-2017-rich-list_i_070517_f.pdf (accessed 22 
June 2020). 
 
Azoulay D, Villa P, Arellano Y, Gordon M, Moon D, Miller K and Thompson K (2019) Plastic 
and Health: The Hidden Cost of a Plastic Planet. Washington DC: Center for International 
Environmental Law. 
 
Benanav A (2015) Precarity Rising. Viewpoint Magazine. Available at: 
https://viewpointmag.com/2015/06/15/precarity-rising/ (accessed 20 June 2020). 
 
Benanav A (2020) Automation and the Future of Work. London: Verso. 
 
Brand U and Wissen M (2021) The Imperial Mode of Living: Everyday Life and the Ecological 
Crisis of Capitalism. London: Verso. 
 
Bush J, Moffatt S and Dunn C (2001) ‘Even the birds round here cough’: stigma, air pollution 
and health in Teesside. Health & Place 7: 47-56. 
 
Charnock G and Starosta G (2018) Towards a ‘unified field theory’ of uneven development: 
human productive subjectivity, capital and the international. Global Society 32(3): 324-343. 
 
Committee on Climate Change (2019) Reducing emissions in Scotland: 2019 progress report 
to parliament. Available at: https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2019/12/Reducing-emissions-in-Scotland-2019-Progress-Report-to-
Parliament-CCC.pdf (accessed 4 June 2020). 
 
Community Links (2019) Grangemouth ‘Your Place Your Views’ consultation: final report. 
Unpublished. 
 
Cowie J and Heathcott J (2003) Beyond the Ruins: The Meanings of Deindustrialization. Ithaca 
(NY): Cornell University Press. 
 
Davies T (2018) Toxic space and time: slow violence, necropolitics, and petrochemical 
pollution. Annals of the American Association of Geographers 108(6): 1537-1553. 
 
East D (2018) Guest blog: INEOS O&P UK on apprenticeships. In Forth Valley College 
Fusion Blog. Available at: https://fvcfusion.com/features/guest-blog-INEOS-op-uk-on-
apprenticeships (accessed 3 June 2020). 
 
Edwards R (2019) Named: the ‘dirty dozen’ companies that pollute Scotland. The Ferret, 6 
January. Available at: https://theferret.scot/dirty-dozen-companies-pollute-scotland/ (accessed 
4 June 2020). 
 
Edwards R (2020) INEOS ‘under-reporting’ climate emissions, says regulator. The Ferret, 29 
June. Available at: https://theferret.scot/ineos-under-reporting-climate-emissions-regulator/ 
(accessed 8 July 2020). 
 
Falkirk Council (2020) Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation 2020. Available at: 
https://www.falkirk.gov.uk/services/council-democracy/statistics-
census/docs/simd/Scottish%20Index%20of%20Multiple%20Deprivation%20Report%202020
.pdf?v=202001281540 (accessed 2 June 2020). 
 
Feltrin L and Sacchetto D (2021) The work-technology nexus and working-class 
environmentalism: workerism versus capitalist noxiousness in Italy’s Long 1968. Theory & 
Society 50(5): 815-835. 
 
Financial Times (2019) INEOS/UK tax: Jim’ll switch it. Financial Times, 18 February. 
Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/4d8dbdc0-3383-11e9-bd3a-8b2a211d90d5 
(accessed 3 June 2020). 
 
Food & Water Europe (2017) INEOS’ chequered environmental track record in Europe. 
Available at: https://www.foodandwatereurope.org/reports/ineos-chequered-environmental-
track-record-in-europe/ (accessed 4 June 2020). 
 
Hanieh A (2021) Petrochemical empire. New Left Review 130: 25-51. 
 
High S, MacKinnon L and Perchard A (eds) (2017) The Deindustrialized World: Confronting 
Ruination in Postindustrial Places. Vancouver: UBC Press. 
 
INEOS (2016) Government support was crucial, says INEOS. Available at: 
https://www.ineos.com/inch-magazine/articles/issue-11/government-support-was-crucial-
says-ineos/ (accessed 3 June 2020). 
 
INEOS (2020a) Welcome to INEOS Grangemouth. Available at: 
https://www.INEOS.com/globalassets/INEOS-group/grangemouth/about/INEOS-
grangemouth-a5-visitor-welcome-bookletfinal-pdf.pdf (accessed 25 May 2020). 
 
INEOS (2020b) Careers. Available at: https://www.ineos.com/sites/grangemouth/careers/ 
(accessed 3 June 2020). 
 
Jephcote C and Mah A (2019) Regional inequalities in benzene exposures across the European 
petrochemical industry: a bayesian multilevel modelling approach. Environment International 
132: 1-17. 
 
Jerolmack C and Walker ET (2018) Please in my backyard: quiet mobilization in support of 
fracking in an Appalachian community. American Journal of Sociology 124(2): 479-516. 
 
Lafuente Hérnandez S, Jamar D and Martínez E (2016) Respuestas sindicales ante el desafío 
de la empresa-red: sector petroquímico y nuclear. Cuadernos de relaciones laborales 34(1): 
151-171. 
 
Lerner S (2012) Sacrifice Zones: The Front Lines of Toxic Chemical Exposure in the United 
States. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press. 
 
López-Navarro M (2020) Legitimating confrontational discourses by local environmental 
groups: the case of air quality monitoring in a Spanish industrial area. In Davies T and Mah A 
(eds) Toxic Truths: Environmental Justice and Citizen Science in a Post-truth Age. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 182-198. 
 
Lyon M (2017) The Battle of Grangemouth: A Worker’s Story. London: Lawrence & Wishart. 
 
Mah A (2012) Industrial Ruination, Community and Place: Landscapes and Legacies of Urban 
Decline. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
 
Markovitz G and Rosner D (2002) Deceit and Denial: The Deadly Politics of Industrial 
Pollution. Berkeley (CA): University of California Press. 
 
McGrath JP ([1973] 2015) The Cheviot, The Stag and the Black, Black Oil. London: 
Bloomsbury. 
 
McIvor A (2017) Deindustrialization embodied: work, health, and disability in the United 
Kingdom since the mid-twentieth century. In High S, MacKinnon L and Perchard A (eds) The 
Deindustrialized World: Confronting Ruination in Postindustrial Places. Vancouver: UBC 
Press, pp. 25-45. 
 
Miller H (2017) What’s been happening to corporation tax? Available at: 
https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/9207 (accessed 4 June 2020). 
 
Moore PV, Upchurch M and Whittaker X (2018) Humans and Machines at Work: Monitoring, 
Surveillance and Automation in Contemporary Capitalism. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Moraitis A and Copley J (2021) Capitalism in decline: automation in a stagnant economy. 
ROAR Magazine. Available at: https://roarmag.org/essays/automation-benavav-smith-review/ 
(accessed 25 August 2021). 
 
Mudu P, Terracini B and Martuzzi M (eds) (2014) Human Health in Areas with Industrial 
Contamination. Copenhagen: World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe. 
 
Neilson B and Rossiter N (2008) Precarity as a political concept, or, Fordism as exception. 
Theory, Culture & Society 25(7-8): 51-72. 
 
Nixon R (2011) Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor. Cambridge (MA): 
Harvard University Press. 
 
Phillimore P, Schlüter A, Pless-Mulloli T and Bell P (2007) Residents, regulators, and risk in 
two industrial towns. Environment and Planning C 25(1): 73-89. 
 
Phillips J (2013) Deindustrialization and the moral economy of the Scottish coalfields, 1947 to 
1991. International Labor and Working-Class History 84(1): 99-115. 
 
Ratcliffe J and Heath U (2018) The Alchemists: The INEOS Story, an Industrial Giant Comes 
of Age. London: Biteback. 
 
Rebitzer JB (1995) Job safety and contract workers in the petrochemical industry. Industrial 
Relations 34(1): 40-57. 
 
Rodrik D (2016) Premature deindustrialization. Journal of Economic Growth 21(1): 1-33. 
 
Rowthorn R and Ramaswamy R (1997) Deindustrialization: causes and implications. IMF 
Working Papers 97/42. 
 
Schlüter A, Phillimore P and Moffatt S (2004) Enough is enough: emerging 'self-help' 
environmentalism in a petrochemical town. Environmental Politics 13(4): 715-733. 
 
Schwab K (2016) The Fourth Industrial Revolution. Cologny: World Economic Forum. 
 
Seborg DE (2009) Automation and control of chemical and petrochemical plants. In 
Unbehauen H (ed) Control Systems, Robotics and Automation: Industrial Applications of 
Control Systems II. Oxford: EOLSS Publishers. 
 
SEPA (2020a) Petroineos permit derogation. Available at: 
https://www.sepa.org.uk/regulations/air/air-quality/petroineos-permit-derogation/ (accessed 4 
June 2020). 
 
SEPA (2020b) Grangemouth. Available at: https://www.sepa.org.uk/regulations/air/air-
quality/grangemouth/ (accessed 22 July 2020). 
 
SEPA (2020c) Scottish business environmental compliance over 90% for fourth year in a row 
in latest SEPA data. Available at: https://media.sepa.org.uk/media-releases/2020/scottish-
business-environmental-compliance-over-90-for-fourth-year-in-a-row-in-latest-sepa-
data.aspx (accessed 4 June 2020). 
 
Smith I (2018) INEOS founder Jim Ratcliffe tops UK Rich List. Financial Times, 13 May. 
Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/26be7496-56a2-11e8-bdb7-f6677d2e1ce8 (accessed 
3 June 2020). 
 
Sun X and Huang R (2020) Spatial meaning-making and urban activism: two tales of anti-PX 
protests in urban China. Journal of Urban Affairs 42(2): 257-277. 
 
The Scotsman (2018) INEOS loses its legal challenge to Scottish government fracking ‘ban’. 
The Scotsman, 19 June. Available at: https://www.scotsman.com/news/environment/ineos-
loses-its-legal-challenge-scottish-government-fracking-ban-646886 (accessed 4 June 2020). 
 
Thomas N (2017) INEOS buys North Sea oil pipeline from BP. Financial Times, 3 April. 
Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/5cc2f47c-1855-11e7-a53d-df09f373be87 (accessed 
26 May 2020). 
 
Tomlinson J (2017) Brexit: blame it on the loss of industrial jobs, not on globalization. In LSE 
Blogs. Available at: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2017/04/28/brexit-blame-it-on-the-
loss-of-industrial-jobs-not-on-globalisation/ (accessed 22 June 2020). 
 
Tregenna F (2009) Characterising deindustrialization: an analysis of changes in manufacturing 
employment and output internationally. Cambridge Journal of Economics 33: 433-466. 
